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Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and 
Drawing Lines: When Does Access to Justice Mean  
Full Representation by Counsel, and  
When Might Less Assistance Suffice? 
Russell Engler1 
INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen an increased focus on issues facing 
unrepresented litigants in civil cases in the courts. With growing recognition 
that unrepresented litigants frequently forfeit important rights—not due to 
the governing law and facts of their cases, but rather due to the absence of 
counsel—courts, bar associations, and legal service providers have 
struggled to respond. The role of an expanded civil right to counsel as a 
component of an overarching access to justice strategy has gained increased 
importance. 
As advocates push for an expanded civil right to counsel, often called a 
“Civil Gideon,” painful theoretical and practical choices challenge efforts to 
establish such a right. While the right is typically framed in sweeping terms, 
the call falls short of seeking publicly funded counsel for all litigants in all 
civil proceedings. Instead, the specter of line drawing looms large. 
Assuming there is an expanded right, who benefits? Which cases, or which 
clients, will be covered by such a right, and under what circumstances? As 
this article discusses, the challenges are nothing new, dating from the early 
writings regarding a civil right to counsel. Line drawing is evident in the 
evolution of the right to counsel on the criminal side as well. 
This article discusses line drawing in the proposals for a civil right to 
counsel and lines that might be drawn in the short term to lay the 
groundwork for progress in the fight to expand access to counsel. Part I 
provides the backdrop to the conversation, which includes the revitalized 
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civil right to counsel movement, the challenges presented by unmet legal 
needs, the flood of unrepresented litigants in courts, and the increased focus 
on access to justice. Part II discusses articles and initiatives in the efforts to 
establish a civil right to counsel. While line drawing is inherent to these 
efforts, and the particular lines drawn differ in some respects, the common 
theme is that these efforts look to a final landscape as to what the right 
should entail, often including or excluding entire categories of cases. Part 
III urges a focus on line drawing as strategy, not necessarily with an eye 
toward the final landscape, but toward starting points on which to build a 
movement. 
I. THE CONTEXT: UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, 
AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL MOVEMENT 
This part positions the revitalized civil right to counsel movement against 
the backdrop of unmet legal needs, unrepresented litigants, and access to 
justice, summarizing each trend in turn. The final two subsections discuss 
more recent events in the civil right to counsel movement: first, the national 
response to the 2006 American Bar Association (ABA) resolution discussed 
below, and second, the scenario in Washington State, the site of the 
conference for which this article was written. 
A. The Revitalized Civil Right to Counsel Movement 
The fortieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright2 was celebrated in 
2003, and in the years that followed, there was a sharp increase in activity 
supporting a civil right to counsel. Articles3 and conferences4 addressed the 
issue, while membership surged in the newly formed National Coalition for 
a Civil Right to Counsel.5 Some advocates have attempted to establish the 
right to counsel by court decision by pursuing test case strategies,6 while 
others have pursued a legislative strategy.7 In 2006, the ABA unanimously 
adopted Resolution 112A, urging the provision of legal counsel as a matter 
of right at public expense to low-income persons in those categories of 
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adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake—such as 
those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health, or child custody—as 
determined by each jurisdiction.8 
B. Unmet Needs and Unrepresented Litigants 
The focus on an expanded civil right to counsel occurred against the 
backdrop of unmet legal needs and unrepresented litigants flooding the 
courts. Legal needs studies consistently show that 70–90 percent of the 
legal needs of the poor go unaddressed.9 Many unmet legal needs involve 
housing, family, and consumer issues.10 Legal services offices represent 
only a fraction of eligible clients seeking assistance.11 
In the “poor people’s courts,” one or both parties appear without counsel 
in most cases. Most family law cases involve at least one party without 
counsel, if not two.12 Most tenants, many landlords, and most debtors 
appear in court without counsel.13 Unrepresented litigants are 
disproportionately minorities and are typically poor.14 They often identify 
an inability to pay for a lawyer as the primary reason for appearing without 
counsel.15 Unrepresented litigants often fare poorly in the courts, which can 
have devastating consequences.16 
As reality set in that unrepresented litigants—also referred to as self-
represented or pro se litigants—were here to stay, the phenomenon gained 
attention across the country.17 Conferences, publications, and websites 
began focusing on problems involving cases with unrepresented litigants.18 
One area of focus is on the changing roles for judges, mediators, and clerks 
in courts with a high volume of unrepresented litigants.19 Innovative 
assistance programs, such as hotlines, technological assistance, clinics, pro 
se clerks offices, Lawyer-of-the-Day programs, and self-help centers are 
another focus. These programs were developed to provide assistance to 
litigants who otherwise would receive no help at all.20 
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C. Access to Justice 
Concern about the fate awaiting unrepresented litigants in the courts gave 
rise to a renewed commitment for access to justice. Conferences of judges 
and state court administrators adopted resolutions calling for the courts to 
provide meaningful access to justice.21 Spurred by these conferences, access 
to justice initiatives intensified across the country.22 The number of state 
access to justice commissions increased rapidly; sixteen states created 
commissions between 2003 and 2008.23 The commissions are comprised of 
members from an array of stakeholders in the legal system.24 The 
commissions also have a broad charge to engage in an ongoing assessment 
of the civil legal needs of the poor and to develop initiatives to respond to 
those needs.25 The work of expanding a civil right to counsel is often 
coordinated with, and bolstered by, the work of state access to justice 
commissions. 
D. Activity in Response to the ABA Resolution 
The adoption of ABA Resolution 112A in 2006 spurred a flurry of 
nationwide activity. In Massachusetts, the Boston Bar Association (BBA) 
created its Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel—which 
was expanded to include members from key statewide stakeholders. In an 
effort to explore starting points for expanding the right to counsel, the Task 
Force identified nine pilot projects in four substantive areas.26 In California, 
advocates drafted two model statutes providing for an expanded civil right 
to counsel.27 In the fall of 2009, California Congressman Mike Feuer 
championed a bill to provide funding for the launching of pilot projects.28 
Advocates in Maryland held a conference dedicated to the topic in 2007.29 
An April 2009 resolution from the Philadelphia Bar Association calling for 
an expanded right to counsel has continued to develop.30 And, in New York, 
advocates convened in March 2008 for a day-long symposium designed to 
create a blueprint for a civil right to counsel in their state.31 Continuing to 
build momentum for change in New York, Chief Judge Lippman called for 
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implementation of a civil right to counsel and appointed the Task Force to 
Expand Access to Legal Services.32 
Efforts to raise awareness and increase support for the expanded Civil 
Gideon include a steady stream of articles, speeches, and conferences.33 At 
the same time, concerns regarding the initiatives emerged: some skeptics 
dismissed the idea as idealistic and unachievable,34 some rejected efforts to 
draw lines or envision the use of lesser forms of assistance,35 and some 
expressed concerns regarding the impact that implementation of such a right 
would have on existing civil legal services and criminal defense programs.36 
As the pace of activity has increased, the worst recession since the Great 
Depression has dramatically increased the number of Americans whose 
basic human needs are at issue in legal proceedings and who need counsel.37 
Yet, the same funding crisis that increases the numbers of those needing 
help has decimated the ability of legal services offices to provide 
assistance.38 Offices relying on money from Interest on Lawyers Trust 
Accounts (IOLTA) have faced devastating cutbacks with plummeting 
interest rates and the collapse of the real estate market.39 Offices dependent 
on aid from state and local governments have faced cutbacks due to the 
fiscal crises facing the government.40 
E. Washington State’s Access to Justice and Civil Right to Counsel 
While trends in Washington State are consistent with those nationwide, 
Washington often plays a leadership role in right to counsel initiatives. The 
Washington State Supreme Court established the Access to Justice Board in 
1994,41 which is a forerunner of the commissions that have proliferated 
around the country. The ensuing annual access to justice conferences laid 
the groundwork for the subsequent calls for recognition of a civil right to 
counsel,42 with portions of the 2002 Access to Justice Conference dedicated 
to the topic.43 The Northwest Justice Project was a founding member of the 
National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel and, soon thereafter, created 
a full-time staff position dedicated to the topic.44 Washington State 
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advocates published articles dedicated to access to justice and the right to 
counsel45 and filed litigation seeking to expand the right to counsel in a 
number of areas.46 In 2007, the state supreme court promulgated Rule 33, 
which provides for requests for accommodation by persons with disabilities; 
among its authorized accommodations are “to otherwise unrepresented 
parties to the proceedings, representation by counsel.”47 
Despite the path-breaking efforts of many in Washington State, its 
indigent residents face many of the same problems as those around the 
country. The state’s 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study “found that 
approximately 87 percent of low-income households in Washington 
experience a civil legal problem, and of that group, 88 percent were forced 
to navigate their way through the judicial system without the benefit of a 
lawyer.”48 As Dean Kellye Testy of the University of Washington School of 
Law noted, the current “numbers are even starker when we consider the 
subsequent deterioration of our state’s economic health, the historic rise in 
unemployment, and the significant increases in the poverty rate.”49 
Continuing to tackle the intractable problems of access to justice and right 
to counsel, the state’s three law schools collaborated to host the February 
2010 symposium entitled, “Civil Legal Representation and Access to 
Justice in Washington: An Invitation to an Important Conversation,” the 
symposium for which this article was written.50 
II. LINE DRAWING IS INHERENT TO THE CONCEPT OF A RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 
A. Early Efforts to Establish the Right 
The ink was barely dry in the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Gideon v. Wainwright51 before advocates sought to expand the right to 
counsel to the civil context. The litigation strategy of expanding the right as 
a matter of federal constitutional law achieved noteworthy success in In re 
Gault, expanding the right to counsel to juvenile cases, before crashing 
Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and Drawing Lines 103 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010 
famously in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, a case involving 
termination of parental rights.52 
The efforts to expand the right from felony cases in Gideon to juvenile 
cases in Gault and termination of parental rights cases in Lassiter reflect 
only one form of line drawing and expansion—by category of cases. In his 
now-classic law review note appearing in the Yale Law Journal in 1967, 
Stanford Professor Thomas Grey articulates other bases for drawing lines.53 
Noting that the U.S. Supreme “Court’s own decisions on the right of 
representation foreclose any claim that counsel is inessential in civil 
trials,”54 Professor Grey asserts that the doctrinal justification for such a 
right was easy to make under due process and equal protection grounds;55 
he then turns to line drawing. While pausing briefly to consider the merits 
of a case-by-case approach similar to that endorsed by Gideon’s predecessor 
Betts v. Brady,56 Professor Grey relies on the Supreme Court’s own 
assessment of Betts in Gideon, and warns that “the ‘troubled journey’ of the 
special circumstances standard should discourage the Supreme Court from 
starting a second trip.”57 A very different Supreme Court operating in very 
different political times would choose to start exactly that trip with Lassiter. 
Professor Grey takes the need for line drawing as a given. He charts a 
likely path to expansion as involving the articulation of a new right in broad 
terms, though actually applying it, at first, to a small number of cases. His 
note identifies bases for line drawing that seem familiar to those involved in 
the right to counsel movement. These include distinctions based on the type 
of case and, therefore, the interest at stake;58 the plaintiff-defendant 
distinction, a theory justified by the voluntariness of the plaintiff’s decision 
to head to court;59 the public plaintiff distinction, which is based on the role 
of the state in the case;60 and what he calls “statutory manipulation,” 
distinctions between state and federal court.61 At every turn, Professor Grey 
discusses the shortcomings of the lines being drawn, noting that “not all of 
these possibilities are equally serviceable.”62 The scope of the right is 
gradually broadened, a technique that “requires resting points, at which the 
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Court can halt expansion of the new right while its implications are digested 
and institutions are developed to carry it into effect.”63 Professor Grey 
labels this process “The Path to an Unqualified Right to Appointed Civil 
Counsel.”64 
The path to an unqualified right to appointed counsel—and the need for 
line drawing—was hardly unique to the civil side. Professor Grey recounted 
the history and charted the expansion on the criminal side: first, the 
establishment of the right in federal capital cases in Powell v. Alabama;65 
second, the expansion through Betts v. Brady66 up through Gideon where 
state felonies are involved; and finally, the expansion into the appellate 
process in Douglas v. California.67 Benjamin Barton recently traced this 
history in far more depth—not to chart the course for expansion of a right to 
counsel on the civil side, but as a cautionary tale of the pitfalls of such a 
process; his concerns increase with each expansion beyond the original 
context of serious felonies.68 
Even with the right to counsel firmly established on the criminal side, 
line drawing persists. The criminal line-drawing doctrine limits the right to 
scenarios involving incarceration.69 In its application, judges, fearful of 
depleting the local budgets that finance the provision of counsel for indigent 
defendants, avoid the appointment by assessing the likelihood that a lengthy 
incarceration will, in fact, be the outcome. Even where the right attaches, 
the quality of counsel, including the painfully low threshold that must be 
achieved to pass muster under the standard of effective assistance of 
counsel, remains a hotly contested issue for analysis and critique.70 
B. States’ Expansion of the Right to Counsel 
While Lassiter thwarted efforts to establish a broad-based civil right to 
counsel as a matter of federal constitutional law, states continued to expand 
the right. As Laura Abel and Max Rettig have catalogued, “states have 
passed hundreds of laws and court rules guaranteeing the right to counsel in 
a wide variety of civil cases.”71 The development varies from court 
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decisions establishing a state constitutional right, to efforts to implement 
federal laws applying to specific categories of individuals, to legislative 
determinations that providing counsel in a particular type of case is sound 
policy.72 
The line drawing in these contexts turns on the type of proceeding. As 
Abel and Rettig observe, most state right-to-counsel statutes and court rules 
fall into three broad categories: “family law matters, involuntary 
commitment, and medical treatment.”73 The family law matters typically 
include abuse and neglect cases and termination of parental rights cases. 
Certain states provide for counsel in domestic violence proceedings, divorce 
and annulment proceedings, paternity proceedings, and child custody 
proceedings.74 Abel and Rettig also identify a few statutes where the right to 
counsel has been given in other areas, including civil arrest or 
imprisonment, individuals under disability to sue, and release of mental 
health records.75 
While Abel and Rettig focus on state statutes, Clare Pastore explores the 
expansion of the right through litigation that targets state constitutions.76 
After discussing how state courts have treated Lassiter, Pastore turns to the 
contexts in which litigants have requested a right to counsel. As with the 
state statutory initiatives, her exploration involves categories of 
proceedings, with analyses considering as key factors the interests at stake 
in the proceeding and the complexity of the process. Termination of 
parental rights cases make up the largest number of state court decisions 
that provide counsel, but the right is not limited to that context.77 Decisions 
also consider the right to counsel involved with civil contempt, civil 
commitment for the mentally ill, paternity, and the regulation of minors’ 
access to abortions.78 While many courts analogize the civil contempt and 
civil commitment cases to criminal context involving the loss of—or 
restrictions on—physical liberty, a significant number of courts find no 
categorical right in the context of civil contempt.79 
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In addition to achieving successes in establishing the right to counsel by 
state statutes and court rules, advocates and scholars continue to lay the 
foundation for expansion into areas not yet recognized by most courts. As 
with the expansion under state law, line drawing invariably focuses on 
categories of cases. Thus, for example, the literature from the period 
covering the first forty years after the Gideon decision set forth the case for 
establishing a right to counsel in eviction,80 divorce,81 termination of 
parental rights,82 and immigration cases.83 
C. Line Drawing in the Recent Initiatives 
The 2006 ABA Resolution 112A84 triggered a renewed focus on line 
drawing as well. While the resolution does speak in terms of defined 
categories (shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and child custody), these 
categories are both broad and general in addressing basic human needs, as 
evidenced by the use of the phrase “such as” before the five articulated 
categories are introduced. Whether the ABA Resolution will prove to be 
merely aspirational or point the way to the ultimate formulation of a defined 
civil right to counsel remains to be seen. The sweeping language of the 
resolution, however, has not eliminated the need to undergo the painful 
process of line drawing in many of the initiatives. 
While the core areas for proposed expansion retain many of the familiar 
contexts for the establishment of the right—such as housing, child custody, 
and immigration—many of the initiatives themselves have opened the door 
to establishing a right to counsel for a subset of the categories of those 
cases. Legislation filed in the New York City Council calls for the 
establishment of a right to counsel for senior citizens in eviction and 
foreclosure proceedings.85 Initiatives in the immigration area include efforts 
to provide a right to counsel for unaccompanied minors facing 
deportation.86 The Washington State court rule covering litigants with 
disabilities recognizes the appointment of counsel as one of the potential 
accommodations that would enable the litigant to achieve meaningful 
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access to the courts.87 In Massachusetts, the legislature enacted what is 
recognized as a qualified right to counsel for elders facing “appointment of 
a guardian, conservator or other protective order” that is triggered not with 
the filing of each case, but “if the ward, incapacitated person or person to be 
protected or someone on his behalf requests appointment of counsel.”88 
Advocates from California, who produced a model statute titled the Equal 
Justice Act,89 confronted many of the challenges of line drawing anticipated 
by Professor Grey.90 In 2004, the California Access to Justice Commission 
created a task force charged with drafting a model statute providing for a 
right to counsel in civil cases for those too poor to afford private counsel.91 
The task force considered questions regarding the scope of the right, 
including whether to extend the right beyond the litigation setting to 
administrative agencies.92 The task force also imposed a merits test that 
reflected Professor Grey’s distinction between plaintiffs and defendants. 
Plaintiffs would be entitled to counsel in scenarios where a reasonable 
person with the financial means to employ counsel would likely do so in 
light of the costs and potential benefits. The standard was somewhat 
broader for defendants, on the theory that they did not choose to initiate the 
proceeding; defendants are eligible for services if there is a reasonable 
probability of achieving a fair outcome.93 
The model statute also articulates exclusions primarily designed to avoid 
expanding the right and providing counsel at public expense, where the 
private sector is capable of filling the gap or where the proceedings are less 
significant. The exclusions include cases involving libel; slander; 
defamation; name change; uncontested, childless marriage dissolutions; 
property or support; and matters in which representation is available on a 
contingent fee basis.94 
Perhaps most intriguingly and controversially, the Equal Justice Act 
recognizes a range of legal services that might be implicated by the right. 
Depending on the scenario, limited legal representation, lay advocacy, 
document preparation, and self-help advocacy, might be the level of 
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assistance implicated by the right might change.95 The concept of a 
spectrum of services as part of the delivery system itself is nothing new and 
has been advocated for by many proponents of legal services and advocates 
for the poor.96 
With the ABA’s passage of Resolution 112A in 2006, the California Task 
Force returned to the drafting table to produce a model act tailored to the 
language of the ABA’s resolution. Labeled the State Basic Access Act,97 the 
act is more limited than the Equal Justice Act in that it defines the scope of 
the right in terms of the five categories that the ABA resolution embraces: 
shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and child custody.98 The act nonetheless 
retains the line drawing from the Equal Justice Act in terms of merits tests, 
categorical exclusions, and the potential for the right to be fulfilled by 
means short of full representation by counsel.99 
The most recent effort to produce a model act is the ABA’s “State Model 
Access Act.”100 The Model Access Act seeks to address the financial and 
administrative concerns of new rights to counsel. It provides for a right to 
counsel only in the five categories of cases specified by the 2006 ABA 
resolution as opposed to all civil cases, caps income eligibility at 125 
percent of the federal poverty level, and includes several exclusions from 
coverage.101 After “extensive and energetic debate,” the ABA House of 
Delegates approved the model act and accompanying principles at the 
annual meeting in August 2010.102 
At first blush, it might seem as if line drawing is more likely to occur in 
the legislative context rather than in the litigation context, where advocates 
have often sought a sweeping statement of the civil right to counsel. Thus, 
petitioners in Kelly v. Warpinski, a custody proceeding in Wisconsin, sought 
a formulation of the right to counsel that extended beyond custody 
proceedings by asking the Wisconsin Supreme Court to “determine whether 
the Wisconsin Constitution accords the right to counsel in civil cases.”103 
Likewise, in Frase v. Barnhart,104 Maryland advocates sought an 
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articulation of the right to counsel that was broader than that subset of 
custody cases. The Appellants’ brief closed with: 
Discussion and debate about the details, and the costs, of a suitably 
enhanced Maryland program of legal services to the poor are 
subjects for another day in another place. They should be 
conducted, however, against a judicial finding that a right to 
counsel inheres in the Maryland constitution. As Ms. Frase has 
demonstrated, she is entitled to such a finding here.105 
A careful reading of the way in which these claims for relief have been 
raised in recent litigation suggests that line drawing will be inevitable, 
regardless of whether the trigger for analysis is litigation or legislation. As 
noted above, immigration advocates have used both administrative 
advocacy and litigation to try to create a right to counsel for a subset of 
claimants, namely unaccompanied minors.106 Moreover, even the litigation 
in both Maryland and Washington that seeks to establish a broad-based 
right to counsel in private custody disputes, contains seeds for achievement 
for just a subset of the broader category of private custody disputes. 
In framing the problem in Frase v. Barnhart, advocates for Ms. Frase 
hammered on the fundamental unfairness of cases pitting unrepresented 
litigants against represented parties.107 While the relief requested in the 
appellant’s brief did not suggest drawing lines within the subset of custody 
cases, a brief filed by amici ended by encouraging the court to “consider the 
inadequacy of services in Maryland in family law disputes . . . [and] require 
the State to afford pro se litigants like Ms. Frase full legal representation in 
order to protect the fundamental rights at issue.”108 While the court could 
have interpreted “pro se litigants like Ms. Frase” to mean all indigent pro se 
litigants in custody proceedings, it could also have limited its ruling to 
litigants in scenarios such as those presented by Ms. Frase, where she was 
pitted against a represented party and ill-equipped to adequately represent 
herself for the reasons reflected in the record. 
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Tension between the desire to expand the right to an entire category of 
cases—or even a subset of those categories—is evident from the briefs in 
the Washington case of In re Marriage of King.109 In that case, advocates 
unsuccessfully sought to establish a broad-based right, at least in the context 
of custody cases. The facts in the record revealed numerous ways in which 
Brenda King was on the wrong side of a severe imbalance of power. As the 
dissent described at length, Ms. King had little formal education, having left 
school in the ninth grade.110 The case involved complex issues, including 
expert psychological issues and allegations of domestic violence.111 Ms. 
King was unable to obtain representation from the legal services office and 
was unable to pay for a private lawyer.112 Not only was her husband 
represented by counsel, but the guardian ad litem expressed views adverse 
to her, and she was forced to play the roles of party, witness, lawyer, and 
scrivener during the emotional and contentious trial.113 The trial court’s 
frustration was palpable, and in the end, Ms. King, who had been the 
primary caregiver, lost custody of her children.114 
Ms. King raised claims under the Washington State Constitution, 
including the protection of meaningful access to the courts, the duty to 
administer justice impartially, the due process clause, and the privileges and 
immunities clause.  On appeal, Ms. King’s lawyers also raised federal due 
process and equal protection claims.115 While the National Coalition’s 
amicus brief discussed the importance of a “categorical” right to counsel,116 
Ms. King’s lawyers articulated the possibility that, should Ms. King prevail, 
the established right might fall short of representation by counsel for all 
indigent litigants in custody. Thus, her attorneys identified factors to be 
considered in determining which litigants should receive full representation 
by counsel, arguing that “[a]t a minimum, counsel should be appointed . . . 
when (a) the proceeding is adversarial; (b) critical interests are at stake; (c) 
the unrepresented litigant is indigent and has made reasonable, but 
unsuccessful, efforts to obtain counsel; and (d) the unrepresented litigant is 
unable to adequately or effectively advocate for his or her interests.”117 By 
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implication, the right to access might mean a lesser form of assistance 
where the factors were not present. The relief sought on appeal was reversal 
and remand “for a new trial with instructions for the Superior Court to 
provide counsel for Brenda King,” not a categorical declaration.118 
Whether a court were to draw the lines itself or leave the matter to the 
legislature and whether the litigants seek a broad formulation of the right or 
suggest ways in which it might be tailored, the drawing of lines is 
inevitable. The line drawing might occur between categories or within 
categories, but it likely will be based on the same types of considerations 
that advocates, scholars, and courts have considered in analyzing the 
development of existing rights and charting possible courses for expansion.  
The next section returns to the process of line drawing, suggesting that a 
key component to the puzzle is strategic: what if the questions were not 
defined by a vision of the final landscape of the right to counsel, but rather 
the consideration of the scenarios that might most successfully present 
starting points or beachheads for moving forward? 
III. LINE DRAWING AS A STRATEGY 
Many of the examples of line drawing above share a common approach: 
they seek to envision the ultimate landscape by setting forth categories at 
the outset that will likely define the scenarios in which the right to counsel 
should attach. Whatever the benefits are in having clear terms to identify the 
scenarios in which the right to counsel should exist, the reality is that we are 
approaching the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon, and only minimal progress 
has been made to expand the right to counsel beyond the scenarios 
recognized by state statutes and courts in the 1970s and 1980s. This reality 
suggests that we should try a different approach and instead explore the 
challenge of line drawing not with an eye toward the final landscape, 
however just and compelling as it may be, but with an eye toward starting 
points on which to build momentum. Although Professor Grey focused on a 
litigation strategy leading to an unqualified right to counsel, he recognized 
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the need to start with a small number of cases—with resting points—as the 
right expands.119 
The notion of identifying likely starting points in an incremental strategy 
for broader expansion is hardly new. The strategy that led to Brown v. 
Board of Education is a familiar story to many; it targeted graduate schools 
and built toward public elementary schools over a journey that stretched for 
roughly thirty years. That strategy carried with it the belief that victory in 
one context would not limit the right to only that context but sow the seeds 
for expansion.120 The path to a right to appointed counsel in the criminal 
context, from Powell to Gideon and its progeny, never reflected the belief 
that the right should be limited to each new context, but that the case 
pending was compelling and might lay the foundation for future expansion. 
The same is undoubtedly true with immigration efforts focused on 
unaccompanied minors, eviction or foreclosure cases in New York City 
focused on elders, and Washington’s court rule focused on disabled 
litigants. Advocates do not pursue those strategies because they believe the 
right should be limited to those contexts, but because they present 
compelling starting points. 
This section discusses both a framework for beginning the process of 
identifying starting points and the manner in which existing data might be 
useful in the process. It concludes by discussing experiments under way in 
Massachusetts and the process that led to those experiments, before 
identifying scenarios that might lend themselves to the most promising 
starting points. 
A. A Framework for Decision Making 
A civil right to counsel should, therefore, be developed as a component to 
a coherent access to justice strategy.121 I have articulated elsewhere a three-
pronged approach: 
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1.  the expansion of the roles of the court system’s key players—such 
as judges, court-connected mediators, and clerks—to require them 
to assist unrepresented litigants as necessary to prevent a forfeiture 
of important rights; 
2.  the use of assistance programs, rigorously evaluated to identify 
which programs most effectively protect litigants from the 
forfeiture of rights; and 
3.  the adoption of a civil right to counsel where the expansion of the 
roles of the key players and assistance programs do not provide the 
necessary help to vulnerable litigants.122 
With regard to Prong 1, I have explored the need and justification for a 
revision of the roles of the key players.123 The rules implicating the analysis 
are general, and the standard application of the rules governing judges, 
mediators, and clerks in fact patterns that confront the court personnel daily 
depends on the custom established in court, not the text of the rules. While 
judges and clerks historically viewed their roles toward unrepresented 
litigants passively, the past decade has seen a shift in attitudes. Conferences, 
trainings, access to justice resolutions, and the work of state access to 
justice commissions accelerated these trends.124 
The need to revise the roles of key players flows from needs of the 
litigants—consumers of the courts—appearing without counsel in vast 
numbers.125 The underlying goals of our justice system are to be fair and 
just. The ethical rules shaping the roles of the players in the adversary 
system imply that unrepresented litigants are the exception. Given the 
realities of many of our courts, our traditional understanding of these roles 
frustrates rather than furthers the goals of fairness and justice. As between 
abandoning the goal and changing the roles, we should change the roles. 
The focus on fairness and justice, in substance and not simply 
appearance, requires shifting the approach to cases involving unrepresented 
litigants. We must revise our understanding of what it means to be impartial 
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and reject the idea that impartiality equals passivity.126 A system favoring 
those with lawyers, without regard to the law and facts, is a partial, not 
impartial, system. Judges, court-connected mediators, and clerks must play 
an active role to maintain the system’s impartiality and ensure that 
unrepresented litigants do not forfeit rights due to the absence of counsel.127 
Access to justice or equal justice initiatives speak in sweeping terms 
consistent with Prong 1. Thus, the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) 
promulgated Resolution 23, titled “Leadership to Promote Equal Justice,” 
which resolved in part to “[r]emove impediments to access to the justice 
system, including physical, economic, psychological and language 
barriers.”128 In 2002, the CCJ and Conference of State Court Administrators 
(COSCA) resolved that “courts have an affirmative obligation to ensure that 
all litigants have meaningful access to the courts, regardless of [their] 
representation status.”129 
Prong 2 captures an array of assistance programs beyond the work of 
court personnel but short of full representation by counsel. Telephone 
hotlines, self-help centers, pro se offices, advice-only clinics, and court-
annexed limited legal services programs all assist unrepresented litigants in 
the courts.130 These innovative programs are an important component in the 
strategy to increase access to justice. Yet, a comprehensive access to justice 
strategy requires that we evaluate assistance programs carefully. Evaluation 
tools must identify which programs help stem the forfeiture of rights and 
which only help the courts run more smoothly, without affecting case 
outcomes.131 Programs not affecting case outcomes may be worthwhile, but 
they are not a solution to the problem of the forfeiture of rights due to the 
absence of counsel. 
When revising the roles of judges, mediators, and clerks and when using 
assistance programs short of full representation, we can no longer accept the 
denial of access and routine forfeiture of rights as acceptable outcomes. In 
those instances, we must recognize and establish a right to appointed 
counsel in civil cases. The scope of the right to counsel is directly 
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dependent on the effectiveness of the first two prongs in the access to 
justice program. The more that judges, mediators, clerks, and assistance 
programs are effective in stemming the forfeiture of rights due to the 
absence of counsel, the smaller the pool of cases will be in which counsel is 
needed. Where nothing short of full representation can provide the needed 
assistance, the right to counsel must attach. 
B. Using Data to Inform Line Drawing 
 The framework for access to justice initiatives should be informed not 
only by the existing data but also by the identification of research agendas 
that can help fill gaps in that existing data. Many reports from across the 
country explore the impact of counsel in various settings that handle civil 
cases.132 Reports consistently show that representation is a significant 
variable affecting a claimant’s chances for success in eviction, custody, and 
debt collection cases, as well as administrative proceedings. Rebecca 
Sandefur’s meta-analysis of studies on the effects of representation reports 
that “parties represented by lawyers are between 17 percent more likely and 
1380 percent more likely to receive favorable outcomes in adjudication than 
are parties appearing pro se.”133 
While the presence of counsel can dramatically affect case outcomes, that 
factor is only one variable. Other key variables include the substantive law, 
the complexity of the procedures, the individual judges, and the overall 
operation of the forum. The data show that the greater the imbalance of 
power between the parties, the more likely it is that extensive assistance will 
be necessary to impact the case outcome. That power or powerlessness can 
derive from the substantive or procedural law, the judge, or the operation of 
the forum. Disparities in economic resources, barriers such as those due to 
race, ethnicity, disability, and language, and the presence of counsel for 
only one side can affect the calculus as well. The greater the imbalance of 
power is, the greater the need for a skilled advocate with expertise in the 
forum to provide needed help.134 
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While gaps in our knowledge suggest the need for additional research, 
the stakes for unrepresented litigants are too high for us to refrain from 
acting. Where we can already identify likely starting points for reform, the 
price of delay outweighs the costs of uncertainty. As we continue to 
evaluate existing and new programs, developing and considering additional 
data will provide critical information in helping to identify the most 
important starting points and the manner in which to respond to those areas 
of need. 
C. Using Experimentation to Inform Line Drawing 
1. The Process of Sorting 
Given the importance of identifying starting points, it is helpful to 
identify discrete steps to undertake in moving the analysis along. An 
unwillingness to begin with incremental steps runs the risk of achieving no 
movement at all, as the initiatives get stalled by concerns about the ultimate 
landscape, or opportunities for potential gains are passed over because of 
the enormity of the task of achieving a more broad-based right. One 
approach for identifying starting points is the seven-step strategy I 
presented at the 2010 Washington Conference and have developed 
elsewhere: 
1.   Identify likely areas in which counsel is most needed. 
2.   Review available data. 
3.   Put 1 and 2 together. This step involves matching each area 
identified in Step 1 with available data on the impact of 
representation in Step 2 to identify core areas in which data 
demonstrates the importance of counsel. Some areas, such as small 
claims cases—in which counsel has a big impact—may drop back 
if the interest at stake does not involve a core area from Step 1. 
Others, such as eviction cases and custody cases, may move 
forward—but not necessarily for the entire docket—absent 
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evidence that power imbalances seem to be extreme across the 
board. 
4.   Identify areas of consensus. The process of Steps 1 through 3 
might produce a list of potential areas where the interest at stake is 
important and data demonstrates the impact of counsel. However, 
there might not be consensus in a jurisdiction on the wisdom of 
moving forward on each area remaining on the list. Since the effort 
to achieve an expanded civil right to counsel must be recognized as 
intensely political, Step 4 urges that a promising starting point 
include areas around which there is consensus. 
5.   Obtain estimates as to the volume of cases involved. 
6.   Identify existing resources. 
7.   Identify the best delivery mechanism where new resources are 
needed.135 
Steps such as these allow access to justice communities to begin the 
difficult but essential process of sorting through specific challenges facing 
the delivery system. The process of sorting the most ripe cases for an 
expansion of a right to counsel (Prong 3) necessarily entails leaving entire 
categories of cases, and subsets of other categories, to a form of assistance 
less than full representation. However, with a civil right to counsel 
understood as a component of a larger strategy, the full panoply of options 
is available, including expanding the roles of key players in the court 
system (Prong 1) and expanding assistance programs (Prong 2). The full 
array of access to justice initiatives remains particularly essential to 
scenarios that do not make the first cut for potential starting points. The 
focus on data requires a more disciplined analysis of the scope of the 
problem need by need, court by court, or group by group. The emphasis on 
evaluation encourages experimentation, but with an eye toward measuring 
the effectiveness of the assistance received in terms of case outcome, rather 
than accepting the mere fact of assistance as sufficient. 
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2. The Massachusetts Pilot Projects 
Advocates in Massachusetts began the process of experimentation and 
line drawing through the work of the BBA Task Force on Expanding the 
Civil Right to Counsel. Created in 2007 in response to the adoption of ABA 
Resolution 112A (and including members from key statewide leaders in the 
legal community), the Task Force used a process similar to the seven-step 
approach to identify subject areas by pairing basic human needs with 
evidence of the impact of counsel in order to yield starting points in the 
areas of housing, family, juvenile, and immigration law.136 
In the area of housing, the Task Force obtained input from judges and 
advocates, in addition to collecting statistics and relevant data regarding 
summary process (eviction) cases in housing and district courts—the two 
types of courts in Massachusetts that handle these cases. To assist 
unrepresented litigants, the Task Force committee members also read 
reports and data from around the country on housing, eviction, and 
homelessness, in addition to interviewing advocates and court personnel 
about existing programs. 
The survey responses, while often indicating a preference for providing 
representation for all unrepresented tenants, identified scenarios in which 
the power lined up against the unrepresented litigant was overwhelming, 
such as evictions related to criminal conduct, scenarios in which 
governmental agencies were involved in the eviction, or cases in which the 
litigants were particularly vulnerable. As the Task Force worked to identify 
discrete areas for representation around which a feasible pilot project could 
be constructed, tensions emerged with respect to the role of discretion in 
screening cases, the need to provide some form of assistance for cases not 
accepted for full representation, and the reality that the housing courts 
already possessed certain resources (such as Housing Specialists and 
Tenancy Preservation Projects) that do not exist in the district courts. A 
final tension involved the potential imbalance in any representation 
proposal regarding assistance for landlords and tenants.137  
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After weighing the input from all sources and considering the various 
tensions raised, the Task Force settled on pilot projects which would 
eventually be launched in one housing court and one district court.138 As the 
report explained, the representation proposal resolved the tension between 
discrete categories and the need for discretion by identifying two specific 
categories, plus a carefully subscribed discretionary category guided by six 
explicit factors. The first subsection focuses on potentially the most 
vulnerable tenants—those with mental disabilities. The second subsection 
responds to the concerns where criminal behavior is at risk, thus avoiding 
the anomalous and inefficient situation in which representation is available 
by right in the criminal context, but not for the related eviction. Subsection 
three was crafted to guide the careful exercise of discretion—it requires 
consideration not only of the tenant’s vulnerability, but focuses further on 
cases in which the landlord is represented, the housing is affordable, and the 
tenant has potentially meritorious claims and defenses.139 On the landlord’s 
side, the goals remained to provide representation for indigent litigants 
where shelter is at stake and the opposing party is represented. Finally, 
regarding the tension between crafting a representation proposal and 
furthering the goal of obtaining at least some assistance for all tenants, the 
proposal endorses the expanded use of assistance programs throughout the 
state.140 
Despite the bleak economic picture, proposals urged by the Task Force 
moved forward, even if more slowly than was hoped for. Task Force leaders 
obtained funding to launch Civil Gideon eviction defense pilot projects in 
the Quincy District Court and the Northeast Housing Court. Because a staff-
based model was selected, the project had the dual effect of launching the 
first pilot projects and cushioning further legal services layoffs.141 The pilot 
projects were scheduled to run for a year, beginning in May 2009. The 
projects were supported by forms of evaluation that included analysis of a 
randomized study, assessment of the court dockets, efforts to follow 
120 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
litigants after the period of the study, and interviews with judges, advocates, 
and other personnel involved.142 
In the area of family law, the Task Force’s work coincided with reforms 
of the guardianship laws that included the establishment in 2009, by statute, 
of a right to counsel for elderly people facing guardianship petitions.143 In 
the custody area, data collection was key to moving the ball forward. 
Informal analysis of the dockets in both probate and family courts suggested 
that the number of custody cases pitting an indigent, unrepresented party 
against a represented one was smaller than anticipated. This revelation led 
to renewed planning for a pilot project for this subset of custody cases.144 In 
the area of immigration, the private pro bono project “KIND” (Kids in Need 
of Defense), supported by Microsoft, has collaborated with Greater Boston 
Legal Services to provide representation for unaccompanied minors in 
deportation proceedings.145 
3. Other Experimentation 
The Massachusetts pilot projects left the gates first, but they are not the 
only example of states experimenting with line drawing. The landmark 
California legislation did not establish a right to counsel, but rather a 
funding stream to set up pilot projects in support of such a right. Thus, the 
bill provides that it: 
. . . would state the intent of the Legislature to expand the 
availability of legal counsel in critical civil matters through locally 
controlled pilot programs designed to test and evaluate new 
methods for the fair and cost-efficient resolution of legal disputes, 
and the comprehensive enforcement of vital legal rights, with 
respect to basic human needs. The bill would state the additional 
intent of the Legislature to encourage the legal profession to make 
further efforts to meet its professional responsibilities and other 
obligations by providing pro bono legal services and financial 
support of nonprofit legal organizations that provide free legal 
services to underserved communities.146 
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The process involves a significant amount of time, planning, and 
establishing criteria for the pilot projects before they are launched and 
evaluated.147 The Texas Access to Justice Foundation recently funded two 
pilot projects: one providing for counsel in nonjudicial foreclosure cases 
and the other in eviction defense cases.148 
In a separate initiative, Michael Finigan, Director of Policy Research of 
Northwest Professional Consortium Research, presented the Civil Right to 
Counsel Pilot Study Preliminary Results at the Seattle University School of 
Law Symposium in February 2010.149 Following the day-long conference 
entitled “Civil Legal Representation and Access to Justice,” key members 
of the Washington access to justice community convened in a working 
session “to arrive at consensus on fundamental principles of a right to civil 
representation by counsel in Washington” and to “identify next steps toward 
achieving the goals reflected in the statement of principles.”150 
D. Drawing the Line by Identifying Starting Points 
The preceding analysis suggests clues as to the types of scenarios that 
will yield promising starting points for expanding a civil right to counsel. 
We know that likely subjects will involve the types of basic human needs 
described in the ABA Resolution: shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and 
child custody.151 This section discusses the realities of the dynamics of 
power, politics, the need for beachheads, and the dynamic nature of the 
process that might lead to an expanded right to counsel. However wise a 
particular strategy may seem on the drawing board, these realities will 
demonstrate the need for flexibility and opportunism along the way. 
1. Power Dynamics 
From the available studies of courts, we know that the greater the power 
imbalance between parties, the greater the level of intervention will be 
needed for assistance. That dynamic commonly occurs in a variety of cases. 
Eviction cases pit vulnerable tenants against powerful landlords. Victims of 
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domestic violence fighting their abusers in custody proceedings are 
vulnerable as well, particularly where counsel represents the opposing 
party. The results from surveys of judges demonstrate that scenarios pitting 
an unrepresented party against a represented one are the most difficult for 
judges to handle,152 so solutions from Prong 1 of the comprehensive 
strategy are unlikely to be effective. Early reports from triage efforts of self-
help centers suggest that these are the cases in most need of referrals too.153 
The concept of identifying power imbalances provided one of the 
“common threads” that emerged in the BBA Task Force’s selection of pilot 
projects. As the Report explains, some of the pilots flowed from scenarios 
that were closely analogous to the criminal context—where physical liberty 
was at stake—while others “involved the potential loss of basic human 
needs due to a dramatic power imbalance.”154 Those power imbalances 
often flowed from the vulnerability of a family whose basic needs are in 
jeopardy, as well as the comparative power of an adverse party.”155 
2. Politics and Beachheads 
While the identification of power imbalances is a promising and 
compelling area for expansion, the methodical process described above 
need not be pursued at the expense of other initiatives. At the Symposium 
“Civil Legal Representation and Access to Justice” in Washington State, 
Laura Abel discussed the dynamic nature of the process, including twelve 
examples of recent state statutes expanding the right to counsel in civil 
cases.156 Statutes in the areas of termination of parental rights, child abuse 
and neglect, special immigrant juvenile status, child custody, and 
guardianship come from states such as Arkansas, Hawaii, Montana, New 
York, and Texas.157 
Litigation has yielded some success as well. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court extended the right to counsel to parents at the dispositional 
phase of a CHINS (children in need of services) proceeding if the judge is 
considering awarding custody to the Department of Social Services.158 In 
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Alaska, litigation led to the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent in 
a private custody dispute.159 
Decisions to pursue legislation or litigation should include a political 
calculation involving the chances of success and the risks of failure. Failure 
on the legislative front is less dangerous, since an adverse court decision 
could result in long-term harm because of the power of precedent. The 
political nature of the calculation is evident in the seven-step approach, as 
well, which suggests moving ahead to compelling areas where there is 
consensus. Political issues, such as the foreclosure crisis and immigration 
reform, as well as moments of change in priorities or elected officials in the 
political arena, might yield opportunities to press the case.160 As Chief 
Judge Lippmann’s recent efforts in New York illustrate,161 the advent of 
strong leadership might allow for a more aggressive response to the 
problem than might previously have been thought feasible. 
3. The Dynamic Nature of the Process Applied to the Comprehensive 
Strategy 
The dynamic nature of the process is evident in both the legislative and 
litigation successes, as well as the broader access to justice strategy 
articulated in this article. The need for a right to counsel (Prong 3) is tied 
directly to the effectiveness of the efforts of the court system and assistance 
programs short of full representation (Prongs 1 and 2). The better the job 
that the courts do in providing meaningful access, and the more successful 
limited assistance programs are in affecting case outcomes, the smaller the 
pool of cases needing counsel. 
Yet, those initiatives are dynamic as well. As noted above, in the past 
decade, those in the court system have significantly changed their approach 
in cases involve unrepresented litigants. As more judges, court-connected 
mediators, and clerks accept as part of their role the need to provide 
meaningful access—and as their supervisors consider those goals in hiring, 
training, and administrative directives they promulgate—the courts may 
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become increasingly more effective in delivering access. Richard Zorza’s 
recent call for transforming the courts into access to justice institutions 
provides one vision of the types of potential changes.162 As successes are 
communicated from court to court and state to state, and as techniques are 
refined, the process will accelerate. 
The experimentation, evaluation, and sharing of assistance programs is 
comparatively new. While legal services programs have been involved in 
self-help initiatives for years, the focus beyond those programs is a 
relatively recent event. Evaluation techniques are even less refined. 
Programs involving unbundling163 and limited representation are among the 
newer forms, underscoring the dynamic nature of program evolution, but 
rendering an even more complicated evaluation and comparison as we 
analyze the differences among programs.164 As with Prong 1, the successes 
we discover with Prong 2 in providing meaningful access with limited 
assistance will have a direct impact on the scenarios in which full 
representation seems to be the only meaningful form of assistance. 
Apart from the development of new techniques and programs, the 
evolution of our values and political priorities will affect the expansion of 
the right to counsel. The language of the ABA Resolution underscores the 
nature in which the five listed categories are examples of basic human needs 
in need of protection by counsel.165 Changes in the substantive law 
involving healthcare or foreclosure might similarly yield compelling 
scenarios for expanding the right to counsel. Changes in the procedures of 
any of our administrative agencies, whose decisions directly and indirectly 
impact the rights of low-income litigants, will affect the scope of the right 
as well. Changes that help claimants obtain their needed benefits or relief 
through the agency process will reduce the need for counsel. Changes that 
increase the procedural and substantive hurdles will add pressure for an 
expanded right to counsel to additional areas, scenarios, and litigants.166 
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CONCLUSION 
In its Executive Summary, the Massachusetts BBA Task Force 
confronted the most common objections to moving forward on an expanded 
right to counsel:  
For too long, the concept of recognizing a civil Gideon has been 
resisted due to fears that do not comport with the reality of the 
concept. The concept of a civil Gideon, as understood by members 
of this Task Force, stands for the basic proposition that where a 
civil proceeding involves a basic need or right, and nothing short 
of representation by counsel will preserve that right, counsel must 
be provided. No one is calling for a lawyer for all litigants in all 
civil matters. No one is calling for representation by counsel when 
lesser forms of assistance will do. No one is calling for 
representation where the rights at issue do not involve basic human 
needs.167 
With the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon approaching and the pool of 
unrepresented litigants and unmet needs expanding in the face of an 
economic downturn, the need to achieve progress in the quest for an 
expanded civil right to counsel has never been greater. As this article has 
explored, understanding the civil right to counsel as a component of a 
broader access to justice strategy—and maintaining a disciplined focus on 
scenarios involving power imbalances that reflect a breakdown of our 
adversary system’s proper functioning—are essential pieces to the puzzle. 
Mining existing data and creating opportunities to enhance our evaluation 
efforts, and in turn, enriching our understanding of the scenarios in which 
counsel is most needed, are key components as well. The success of an 
expanded right to counsel movement might turn less on the ultimate vision 




126 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, New England Law, Boston. This 
work was supported by a stipend from the Board of Trustees of New England School of 
Law. 
2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
3 See, e.g., A Right to a Lawyer? Momentum Grows, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 167–293 
(2006) [hereinafter Momentum Grows]; Russell Engler, Civil Gideon: Shaping a Context-
Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 697 (2006) [hereinafter Civil Gideon]. 
4 Conferences across the country included panels on Civil Gideon as part of the broader 
discussion of Access to Justice in civil cases. For example, The Sparer Symposium, held 
on March 28, 2006 and titled “Civil Gideon: Making the Case,” was co-sponsored by 
Rutgers, Penn, Villanova, and Widener Law Schools, available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/pic/students/Sparer06Program.pdf. For information on 
Washington State’s Access to Justice Conference in 2002, which included a panel 
dedicated to the topic, see Paul Marvy, “To Promote Jurisprudential Understanding of 
the Law”: The Civil Right to Counsel in Washington State, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
180 (2006). 
5See, e.g., Paul Marvy & Debra Gardner, A Civil Right to Counsel for the Poor, 32 HUM. 
RTS. 8, 9 (2005). 
6See, e.g., In re Marriage of King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash. 2007); Frase v. Barnhart, 840 
A.2d 144 (Md. 2003); Brief of Petitioner, Kelly v. Warpinski, No. 04-2999-0A (Wis. 
Nov. 17, 2004) (petition denied Apr. 6, 2005). 
7 See, e.g., H.B. 2124, 79th Leg. (Tex.), available at 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=79R&Bill=HB2124 
(relating to appointment of counsel in appeals of certain eviction suits). Advocates in 
California are drafting a Model Statute. See Clare Pastore, The California Model Statute 
Task Force, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 176 (July-August 2006); The State Equal Justice 
Act, infra note 27. Advocates in New York recently expanded the reach of the statutory 
right to counsel in divorce cases to the Supreme Court and drafted and arranged for the 
filing of legislation initiatives covering the elderly in eviction and foreclosure cases. See 
N.Y. JUD. LAW §35(8) (amended September 2006); Manny Fernandez, Free Legal Aid 
Sought for the Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/16/nyregion/16housing.html. 
8 The American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted Resolution 112A on August 
7, 2006, at its Annual Meeting. See A.B.A., REP. TO THE H.D. 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf, for the text of the 
resolution proposed by the ABA Task Force on Access to Civil Justice, which was 
modified only slightly before adoption by the House of Delegates by inclusion of the 
final five words (“as determined by each jurisdiction”), 
http://www.abanet.org/media/docs/112Arevised.pdf. 
9 Legal Servs. Corp., Documenting the Justice Gap In America: The Current Unmet Civil 
Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans (Sept. 2005), http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf 
(finding in a 1994 American Bar Association study that virtually “all of the recent state 
studies found a level of need substantially higher than the level.” Id. at 13 (emphasis in 
original)). 
Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and Drawing Lines 127 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010 
 
10 Id. 
11 See Alan W. Houseman, The Future of Civil Legal Aid: A National Perspective, 10 
UDC/DCSL L. REV. 35, 43–46 (2007). 
12 Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the 
Role of Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2047–48 (1999) 
[hereinafter Justice for All]; see also John M. Greacen, Self-Represented Litigants and 
Court and Legal Services Responses to Their Needs: What We Know (2002), 
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/SRLwhatweknow.pdf; see OFFICE OF 
THE DEPUTY CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE FOR JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: CHARACTERISTICS, NEEDS, SERVICES—THE RESULTS OF 
TWO SURVEYS (2005) [hereinafter TWO SURVEYS], for a survey of litigants in New York 
City finding that 75 percent of the litigants in the New York City Family Court and 90 
percent of the tenants in Housing Court appeared without counsel. 
13 E.g., Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing 
Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 41 (2010) 
[hereinafter Connecting Self-Representation]. 
14 See, e.g., id.; JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC’Y & STATE 
JUSTICE INST., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND 
GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS (1998) [hereinafter MEETING THE 
CHALLENGE]; Greacen, supra note 12; TWO SURVEYS, supra note 12 (finding that, in 
New York City, 79 percent of the self-represented litigants in Family and Housing Courts 
were African American or Hispanic. Id. at 3. Regarding income, 21 percent had incomes 
below $10,000, an additional 36 percent had incomes between $10,000 and $20,000, and 
another 26 percent had incomes between $21,000 and $30,000; thus 83 percent of the 
self-represented litigants had incomes below $30,000. Id. at 4. Spanish-speaking litigants 
had less formal education than English-speaking litigants. Id.). 
15 See, e.g., TWO SURVEYS, supra note 12, at 7 (60 percent of the litigants reported that 
they could not afford counsel); Connecting Self-Representation, supra note 13, at 41; 
Boston Bar Ass'n, Boston Bar Association Task Force on Unrepresented Litigants 
Report, 17 (1998), http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/unrepresented0898.pdf ("Most 
of the unrepresented litigants [in the Boston Housing Court] reported that they wanted an 
attorney but felt they could not afford one."); N.H. Sup. Ct. Task Force on Self-
Representation, Challenge to Justice: A Report on Self-Represented Litigants in New 
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lawyer.”).   
16 For a discussion and analysis of many of the studies showing the impact of counsel on 
case outcomes, see generally Connecting Self-Representation, supra note 13. 
17 Id.; MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 14, at 8. 
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M. Greacen, Bonnie Rose Hough & Richard Zorza, Judicial Techniques for Cases 
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AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC’Y & STATE JUSTICE INST., REACHING OUT OR 
OVERREACHING: JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2005), 
http://www.ajs.org/prose/pdfs/Pro%20se%20litigants%20final.pdf. For other examples of 
publications, see Richard Zorza, The Self-Help Friendly Court: Designed from the 
Ground Up to Work for People Without Lawyers, The Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts. (2002), 
available at http://www.lri.lsc.gov/pdf/03/030111_selfhelpct.pdf.  
 For information on the web, see AJS [American Judicature Society] – Publications 
and Resources, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,  
http://www.ajs.org/prose/pro_resources.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (providing pro se 
resources); Self Help Support, SELFHELPSUPPORT.ORG, http://www.selfhelpsupport.org 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (serving as a network for practitioners of self-help programs, 
and is funded by the State Justice Institute); SRLN, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION 
NETWORK, http://www.srln.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
19 See, e.g., Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the 
Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367 (2008) 
[hereinafter Ethics in Transition]; Justice for All, supra note 12; MEETING THE 
CHALLENGE, supra note 18, at 4; Reaching Out or Overreaching, supra note 18; see John 
M. Greacen, Legal Information vs. Legal Advice—Developments During the Last Five 
Years, 84 JUDICATURE 198 (Jan.–Feb. 2001), available at 
http://www.ajs.org/prose/pro_greacen.asp; Albrecht, supra note 18. 
20 See, e.g., Houseman, supra note 11, at 40–43; Justice for All, supra note 12, at 2000–1. 
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21 See, e.g., NAT’L CONF. OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, POSITION PAPER ON SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGATION (Aug. 2000), available at http//costa.ncsc.dni. 
us/WhitePapers/selfrepresentation.pdf (calling on the courts to provide access to justice 
for those without counsel); See CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES, RES. 23: LEADERSHIP TO 
PROMOTE EQUAL JUSTICE (January 21, 2001), available at 
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/AccessToJusticeResolutions/resol23Leadership.html (resolving in 
part to “[r]emove impediments to access to the justice system, including physical, 
economic, psychological and language barriers.”); see CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES, RES. 
31: IN SUPPORT OF A LEADERSHIP ROLE FOR CCJ AND COSCA IN THE DEVELOPMENT, 
IMPLEMENTATION AND COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
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22 See, e.g., EASTERN REGIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 18; NEW YORK STATE 
UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, supra note 18. 
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http://www.massbar.org/media/228975/nov%2007.pdf, for a description of the joint 
Boston Bar Association (BBA) and Massachusetts Bar Association conference to begin 
implementing the resolution.  
27 See Pastore, supra note 7. The two model statutes are The State Equal Justice Act 
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0600/ab_590_bill_20091011_chaptered.pdf. See also Note, California Establishes Pilot 
Programs to Expand Access to Counsel for Low-Income Parties, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1532 (2010). See generally The State Equal Justice Act, supra note 27; The State Basic 
Act, supra note 27.  
29 See Stephen H. Sachs, Keynoted Address: Seeking a Right to Counsel in Appointed 
Civil Cases in Maryland, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 21 (2007).  
30 Phila. Bar Ass’n, Resolution Calling for the Provisions of Legal Counsel for Indigent 




130 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
 
31 The proceedings and related articles are published in the Symposium volume, An 
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State, 25 TOURO L. REV. 1 (2009). 
32 See Jonathan Lippman, Chief Judge, N. Y. Ct. App., Address before the Central 
Synagogue of New York: Justice Shall You Pursue: The Chief Judge’s Perspective on 
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33 See, e.g., New York State Unified Court System, supra note 18; see An Obvious Truth, 
supra note 31, for a summary of the proceedings at the New York conference; 
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34 See, e.g., Debra Garnder, Pursuing a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Introduction and 
Overview, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV 167, 169 (2006).   
35 See John Pollack, Getting Off the Ground: Addressing Implementation of a Right to 
Counsel in Civil Cases, XIV(2) MGMT. INFO. EXCH. 6 (2010) (describing the struggle in 
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36 See e.g., Lonnie Powers et al., Key Questions and Considerations Involved in State 
Deliberations Concerning an Expanded Civil Right to Counsel, XXIV(2) MGMT. INFO. 
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2009) [hereinafter THE JUSTICE GAP, UPDATED REPORT], available at 
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43 Id. at 182. 
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http://civilrighttocounsel.org/news/recent_developments/38. 
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132 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
 
52 See generally Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that the 
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81 See, e.g., William S. McAninch, A Constitutional Right to Counsel for Divorce 
Litigants, 14 J. FAM. L. 509 (1975–76); In re Smiley, supra note 53. 
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83 See, e.g., Sharon Finkel, Voices of Justice: Promoting Fairness Through Appointed 
Counsel for Immigrant Children, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1105 (2001). 
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Principles of a Right to Counsel in Civil Legal Matters.” The Basic Principles document 
follows up on the “ABA Principles of a State System for the Delivery of Civil Legal Aid” 
document that was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 2006. See Pollack, supra 
note 35. 
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